| 摘要: |
| 基于国际石油合作财税体系特征和油气投资生产的特点,构建实现政府收益长期最大化的委托-代理模型,并描述模型中的重要变量和参数;选择三种典型的国际石油财税体系,运用模型对其激励机制进行对比分析。结果表明,激励机制的设计是保障政府收益最大化的关键问题,应根据资源禀赋和自身条件选择合适的激励机制,当风险程度相同时,产品分成合同、矿费税收制合同、服务合同的激励效果递减。 |
| 关键词: 委托-代理理论 油气财税体系 机制设计 国际石油合作 |
| DOI：10.3969/j.issn.1673-5005.2015.02.027 |
| 分类号::F062.5;F416.22 |
| 基金项目:国家科技重大专项(2011ZX05030-006) |
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| Comparison of international petroleum cooperation fiscal systems based on principle-agent theory |
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QIU Xinhua1, WANG Zhen2
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(1.School of Business Administration in China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249, China;2.Academy of Chinese Energy Strategy in China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249, China)
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| Abstract: |
| A mechanism design model that can maximize the profits of host government was built. A comparison of three typical fiscal systems was conducted to contrast the incentive effects by each mechanism. The results show that the designs of fiscal systems shall apply to specific characteristics of the underlying resource. A production sharing contract is the most effective model in motivating international oil and gas cooperation, while the royalty-tax contract and the service contract rank in the second and third place, respectively. |
| Key words: principle-agent theory oil and gas fiscal system mechanism design international petroleum cooperation |
